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The Case for an EU Protagonist Role on Third Party Funding Regulation 
 
Munia El Harti Alonso 
PhD Candidate, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 




The Lisbon Treaty has enlarged the EU’s competences in external investment policy. The EU 
could thus increase its protagonist role in third-party funding (TPF) regulation in a manner 
analogous to its achievements in the investment regime, where the EU managed to rally the 
member states behind DG Trade’s vision. A treaty-based analysis combined with a political 
evaluation suggest the EU is expanding its field of competences either when it has a clear 
mandate or by establishing a modus vivendi as it has been the case with its external relations, 
particularly at the United Nations. There is therefore a case to be made that the EU would 
have the competence and the interest to expand its investment reform leadership to encompass 
TPF regulation. Hong Kong and Singapore have added provisions on TPF in their respective 
national arbitration legislation explicitly allowing TPF as part of a neoliberal strategy to 
attract arbitration while ignoring the risk of increased forum shopping. In contrast, the EU 
CETA and EU-Vietnam Treaties are the only treaties to conceptualize and impose a 
disclosure of TPF, which nevertheless falls short of addressing concerning the adverse 
consequences of TPF in ISDS.1    
 
1. A Treaty-based Rationale for Increased EU Intervention in TPF Regulation 
 
1.1. A treaty-based analysis of the EU’s external investment policy  
 
The EU’s lead in external investment policy has been established by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Articles 206 and 207 TFEU bring 'foreign direct investment' (FDI) « under exclusive EU 
competence as part of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) »2. Article 206 and 207.13 
establish the Common Commercial Policy while article 207.2 and 207.34 assign the 
competences: the Parliament and the Council have the competence to initiate regulatory 
activity, they give the Commission the negotiation directives. The Commission also has the 
possibility to start negotiations by transmitting a recommendation to the Council as it has 
done for the Multilateral Investment Court5.   
 
Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion6 on the EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Treaty, 
followed by the EU Court of Justice Decision,7 adds nuance to the EU/Member States 
competence question by clarifying that dispute resolution is a competence that the EU and its 
Member States share “in concert,” a view which actually strengthens the EU’s legitimacy 
when representing the 28.  
 
1.2. A treaty based rationale for an EU protagonist role on regulation of TPF 
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1.2.1. EU regulation on TPF as a measure against Forum Shopping  
 
On the one hand, The EU has started to regulate TPF in its “new generation” investment 
treaties, CETA and the EU-Vietnam Treaty contain a clause that conceptualizes and imposes 
disclosure of TPF, while on the other hand, Member States have not regulated TPF in their 
legislations. For those rare countries like Singapore and Hong Kong who have added TPF to 
their legislations it was to allow TPF without restrictions. Other countries like the Netherlands 
although no legislation is in force, notoriously allow TPF in jurisprudential practice.  
 
This creates a pattern of regulatory fragmentation and invites Forum Shopping within the EU, 
contrary to the Common Commercial Policy of articles 206, 207.1, as well as the principle of 
Enhanced Cooperation within Title III of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
1.2.2. EU expertise in external relations through a sui generis observer status 
 
The EU represents the 28 Member States in International Economic Institutions8 such as the 
OECD, the IMF, WTO, World Bank and the UN General Assembly. The Lisbon Treaty 
reshaped EU visibility by creating the External Action Service which leads the external 
relations.  
 
The EU is a sui generis entity in foreign relations regarding its unique composition—there is 
no equivalent entity as other economic organizations are composed or mandated by its 
member states. The composition of the EU External Action Service is hybrid as it counts with 
diplomats of member states deployed for the EU and EU officials from other EU institutions.  
Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishes “the organization and functioning 
of the European External Action Service (EEAS)” combined with Article 27.3 of the Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU)9. The EU is thus represented in its external relations by the 
EEAS Head Quarters and its 143 Delegations. The uniqueness of EU external representation 
lies in its hybrid nature coupled with a higher level of expertise. Article 27.3. details the 
External Action Service counts with 1/3 of Member States Diplomats, while Delegations are 
composed of said diplomats (« Seconded National Experts » (SNE)), European Commission 
and European Council Officials.  
 
The EU could be best placed to take a lead in TPF regulation regarding its “know-how” in 
external relations negotiations, with DG Trade, DG Devco handling economic development 
and DG Justice (DGJust) expertise combined with the External Action Service diplomatic 
savoir faire10.  
 
2. A modus vivendi to expand the EU’s leading role    
 
Aside from a Treaty based rationale there is a case to be made for an EU initiative beyond 
textual considerations.  
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The EU has proved its ambition by acting even without a clear mandate, by creating a modus 
vivendi or precedent to establish its sui generis observer status. This has been particularly the 
case within UNCITRAL Arbitration Group II. 
 
2.1. The example of UNCITRAL Arbitration Group II  
 
The EU has used its special observer status at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
(as set forth in UN General Assembly Resolution 65/276 of May 2011) to expand its 
influence within UNCITRAL Working Group II on Arbitration due to its proximity with the 
UNGA Legal Committee (also known as Sixth Committee) and the EU Commission’s 
practice of taking the floor as the “EU” and not as the European Commission.  
 
The Member States finally rallied behind the European Commission on the 20th of April 2018 
by authorizing the European Commission to negotiate within UNCITRAL a Multilateral 
Investment Court (MIC) which seemed unforeseeable to states and academics two years ago.  
 
A similar analysis is in order for the Mauritius Convention on Investor Treaty Transparency, 
strongly supported by the EU, which entered into force last year.  
 
2.2. A European Commission initiative on TPF regulation: innovation and legitimacy 
The Commission and thus the EU has reinforced its front runner capacity and its legitimacy 




The EC could potentially take a lead on TPF as it has done with the MIC and the new type of 
Investment Treaties. As mentioned above the only Investment Treaties containing provisions 
regulating TPF are CETA and the EU-Vietnam Treaties. States so far have not regulated TPF; 
moreover, a state-by-state approach would be fragmented and inefficient. An EC lead in those 
issues could be backed up by states, similarly to other aspects of the investment regime such 
as the consideration of developing states, and transparency.   
 
The Commission has positioned itself as a strong entity, and DG Trade has anticipated the 
criticisms of the investment regime ahead of states11 by pushing for new generation treaties 
and now an institutional reform. Overall the EU is keen on maintaining its lead as an 





The expertise of the EU institutions set out in para 1.2.2. contributes to the legitimacy of an 
EU initiative to regulate TPF. Another aspect of the EU’s legitimacy derives from its 
balanced view, in other words not “pro investor” or pro “TPF funder.” The EU takes into 
account transparency and sustainability in ISDS reform by advocating for the UCNITRAL 
 4 
Transparency Convention as well as being a leader on sustainability. The Sustainable 
Development Goals negotiations by the EU Delegation to the UN were considered by the 
think tank European Council on Foreign Affairs as the highest achievement of the EU: 
“throughout 2015, the EU’s delegation to the UN pushed for UN reform and for a more 
comprehensive, less atomized European approach to the body.13  
 
The EU also takes into account public opinion, by communicating extensively on all its 
initiatives.  
 
For its endeavors to be legitimate the EU has to count on the Member States approval, which 
is the case now concerning the Multilateral Investment Court negotiations. The inclusion of 
TPF within that mandate could be foreseeable.  
 
Finally, since the Treaty of Lisbon the European Parliament (EP) is a co-legislator within the 
limits of article 218 TFUE.14  
 
The EP has sided with the EU Commission (EC) on Investment Treaties by backing the TTIP 
and CETA negotiations. Both the EP and EC are European Union Institutions, while the 
Council has both European Union Officials and Member States in its composition. The 
Council tends to follow the EC and EP.  
 
There is reason to expect that the EP/EU(EC) cooperation could continue and perhaps even be 
enhanced by jointly exercising leadership in the regulation of TPF. 
 
1 See Garcia et al., The Case Against Third-Party Funding in ISDS: Executive Summary, (Boston College Law 
School Faculty Paper Series, 2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/1126. 
2 EU Parliament Report “The EU approach to international investment policy after the Treaty of Lisbon”, 
October 2010 
3 Article 206 (ex Article 131 TEC): By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the 
Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and 
other barriers. 
4 Article 206 reads in relevant part as follows: 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing the 
common commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more third countries or international organizations need to be 
negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall apply, subject to the special provisions of this Article. 
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorize it to open the 
necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the 
agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed 
by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as 
the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the 
European Parliament on the progress of negotiations. 
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5 On 13 September 2017, the Commission issued, based on Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (“TFEU”), a Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the Commission to open 
negotiations on behalf of the EU for an international convention establishing a multilateral court for the 
settlement of investment disputes (the “Recommendation”) 
6 Luxembourg, 21 December 2016. Advocate General's Opinion in Opinion procedure 2/15 Press Release 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/cp160147en.pdf Last consultation 10th of 
April 2018  
7 Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 16 May 2017 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62015CC0002(01)&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= Last consultation 
on 10th of April 2018  
8 E. CASTELLARIN, The European Union's participation in international economic institutions: A mutually 
beneficial reassertion of the centre. In M. Andenas & E. Bjorge (Eds.), A Farewell to Fragmentation: 
Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (Studies on International Courts and Tribunals, pp. 320-342). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139979498.012. 2015 
9 See more from B.Van Vooren, A legal-institutional perspective on the European External Action Service, 
CLEER, 2010 ; Manufacturing Esprit de Corps: The Case of the European External Action Service. / Pomorska, 
K.; Juncos, A. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 2, p. 302-319, 2014 ; Unveiling the anatomy 
of autonomy: dissecting actor-level independence in the European External Action Service. Henökl, Thomas / 
Jarle Trondal Externe Publikationen. in: Journal of European Public Policy 22 (10), 1426-1447. 2015 
10 C.HERMANN et al, Trade Policy between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship: Liber amicorum in memoriam 
Horst G. Krenzler, European Yearbook of International Economic Law, 2015 
11 A-K GRILL and S. LUKIC, Towards a Post-Arbitration Age: The European Commission’s Fast-Track 
Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement, Kluwer Blog, 2017 
12 Conclusions on a comprehensive European international investment policy 3041st FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Council meeting Luxembourg, 25 October 2010 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdf  
13 European Council on Foreign Affairs Publication http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016/issues  
14 Article 218 TFEU reads as follows :   
« The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding the agreement. 
Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the Council shall 
adopt the decision concluding the agreement: 
(a) after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases: 
(i) association agreements; 
(ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; 
(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation procedures; 
(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special 
legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. » 
